21st Century Starters
The Athletic last month published an article in which 12 of its writers entitled to cast Hall of Fame ballots disclosed who they voted for and explained their decisions. This assertion by Stephen Nesbitt, explaining his vote for Andy Pettitte, stood out: “There are already too few starters making it to Cooperstown, and that trend will only worsen with current pitching trends. (The longevity-versus-peak debate cannot function once longevity is no longer an option.)” I am not taking issue with Nesbitt’s vote for Pettitte. But his statement about the paucity of starting pitchers going into the Hall of Fame raises a number of questions.
First, what does he mean that “too few starters” are going into the Hall? Does he mean that Hall of Fame-caliber pitchers are being passed over, or simply that there should be more starters going in—that voters should lower the bar in order to admit more? If he means the latter, that seems problematic. If he means the former, that proposition requires a lot more analysis, but he is probably right.
Next, his assertion that the too-few-starters problem “will only worsen with current pitching trends” may be true in the long run. But there is a significant group of starters who are either certain or reasonably likely to go into the Hall in the next 10 years without any contortion of existing standards. Clayton Kershaw, Justin Verlander and Max Scherzer are locks to be elected on the first ballot, and Zack Greinke also seems likely to do the same given the vote this year for CC Sabathia. Beyond those four, Gerrit Cole and Chris Sale are both building Hall of Fame cases, and will probably get there if they can stay healthy for just a couple more seasons.1 These six would be reminiscent of the 2014-18 gaggle when Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez, John Smoltz, Roy Halladay and Mike Mussina were inducted.
Finally, what about his statement that the “longevity-versus-peak debate cannot function once longevity is no longer an option”? I think there is less a “longevity-versus-peak debate” than a continuing discussion of the appropriate weight to be given to each. That discussion is evolving along with the role of starting pitchers in today’s game. I assume that by “longevity” Nesbitt is referring to cases based on counting stats compiled over long careers (wins, strikeouts, innings pitched, WAR). He is right that these may not as often provide a route to the Hall of Fame as they did for starters like Don Sutton, Jim Kaat or Mike Mussina because fewer pitchers are putting up those kinds of careers.
In a recent piece discussing his 2025 HOF ballot, Jayson Stark wrote, “I don’t know how many voters are left who still use those magic counting numbers as their central guidepost. But it’s time to start thinking up a whole new set of guideposts — because as baseball evolves, we’ll have no choice but to evolve along with it.” It may well be necessary to adjust the weight we place on certain career standards. But many of the metrics that identify great pitchers in past eras still work in the changing environment for starting pitchers. It should be possible to identify a Hall of Fame career based on a wide range of existing measures of excellence without entirely reinventing the criteria for starters.
Career Milestones and Value
It is obviously not realistic to judge starting pitchers of the past couple decades against those who pitched in the late 20th Century on the basis of their total wins, complete games or innings pitched. Nor should it be fatal to the cases of current starters that we cannot do so. No one would dispute the greatness of Pedro Martinez, on the ground he rarely threw more than 250 innings or 10 complete games in a season, while Bob Gibson and Fergie Jenkins routinely threw 280+ innings and 20 or more complete games, or Greg Maddux because he did not throw 150 pitches in a game as Sandy Koufax did repeatedly. Similarly, pitchers such as Gibson and Jenkins are not diminished by comparisons to the innings pitched or wins totals of Cy Young, Walter Johnson and others of the early 20th century. The game changed, but the best pitchers of all those eras stood out as great.
The game for starting pitchers has continued to change. Finishing seven innings is now as rare as a complete game was when Maddux and Martinez were pitching, and managers today often pull even effective starters after recording just 15-18 outs. At least one team has announced it will use a six-man starting rotation this season. A starter on such a team is going to get a maximum of 27-28 starts rather than 32-33 with a five-man rotation or 38-40 with the old four-man rotation. Injuries to starting pitchers have also increased substantially during the past two decades, undermining long careers. For all these reasons, even the best starters are going to pitch fewer games, throw fewer pitches and fewer innings, and generate career counting stats that cannot be expected to match those of pitchers in prior eras, no matter how good they are.
Pitches, Innings and Starts
The average number of innings pitched per start has declined from just over six during the decade 1990-1999 to just over five from 2020-2024. In the 2024 season, only 58 starting pitchers qualified for the ERA title by working at least 162 innings—fewer than two per team. Similarly, the average number of pitches per start has dropped—from 95 in the 90’s and 00’s, to 90 a decade ago, to 85 last year.2
The reduction in innings and pitches per start reflects a combination of (1) managers’ recognition that even the best starters are less effective the third and fourth times through the batting order and (2) the proliferation of effective relief pitchers to take over and make life difficult for hitters. Pedro Martinez was one of the most dominant starters of all time, but hitters’ batting and slugging averages against him still improved significantly after the second time they faced him in a game. Many teams now have several relievers who can come in and, for an inning, throw more effectively than an ace starter working his third time through the batting order.
The shorter duration of starter outings also reflects better understanding by management of the risks posed by pitchers facing more batters. In 1998, Rany Jazayerli published a seminal piece in Baseball Prospectus entitled “Pitcher Abuse Points: A New Way To Measure Pitcher Abuse.” Under his system Jazayerli assigned 1 “abuse point” for every pitch from 101-110, 2 for ever pitch from 111-120, etc.3 A later version of this article, published in 2001 with Keith Woolner, had abuse points for pitches over 100 growing exponentially and concluded that pitchers with above-average PAP were three times as likely to be injured as those who had thrown the same number of total pitches but had fewer PAP. Managers and front offices have taken the message to heart. The best starters today still throw more than 100 pitchers with some frequency, but they never throw more than 120.
Despite management’s best intentions, limiting the number of pitches starters throw has not prevented an upswing in serious arm injuries. In December 2024, MLB released its Report on Pitcher Injuries. Since 2005, the number of days pitchers have spent on the injured list has risen from roughly 12,000 to 33,000. Since 2010, the number of Tommy John surgeries per year by major league pitchers has nearly doubled, and the number of such surgeries at the minor league level has increased threefold. Given time lost to injuries, the chances of a pitcher performing at a high level for 10, 12 or more full seasons have dropped significantly.
The MLB report attributes this increase in pitcher injuries to a number of factors, with the principal one being pitchers seeking more velocity and more spin. Advanced biomechanics and training techniques have made it possible for pitchers to maximize velocity and spin beyond what just “natural ability” would have produced. But they have apparently not found a way to avoid the strain that doing so places on the ligaments that hold the pitcher’s arm together. Another element identified by the report is the extent to which pitchers throw at maximum effort—not only in game situations, but in training as well. As the report explained, “pitch design training has become so prevalent that pitchers are materially increasing non-game intensity and volume in a manner likely to further increase stress on the arm.”4
One irony of the decline in great starting pitcher careers is that pitchers today have better stuff than ever. Collectively, they throw harder and with more spin than pitchers of prior eras. The very thing that is making them so good, though, is also causing them to break down. Tommy John surgery and other surgical repair advancements have salvaged the careers of many pitchers who suffer what used to be career-ending injuries. But the rehabilitation time is generally more than a year, not all pitchers return to their prior form after the surgery, and an increasing number of pitchers (e.g., Shohei Ohtani and Jacob deGrom) are undergoing more than one surgical elbow repair. Long productive careers with 3,000+ innings pitched are becoming remote possibilities.
Wins
For many decades, wins earned by a starting pitcher were the primary measure of his prowess. Winning 300 games over a career was a ticket to Cooperstown and a target for the best starters. Barring some dramatic change in the game (or a miraculous third wind by Justin Verlander), we will never see another 300-game winner, and it is highly unlikely any pitcher will ever post 250 wins after Verlander retires. Today, 200 wins is the new 300. And even that number may prove elusive. Only four active starters have more than 150 wins. Corbin Burnes, in seven years through his age 29 season, has won a Cy Young award, finished in the top 10 five straight years, compiled an ERA of 3.19 and struck out more than 1,000 batters. He has 60 career wins. As Joe Posnanski recently observed, because of the changes in how starters work, “you can’t judge them by wins any more.”
In any event, the importance we attribute to a starter’s wins has been steadily eroding. For several decades, sabermetricians have made the case that wins are overrated because the result depends so much on the team behind the pitcher. And that view is now widely accepted. Winning is still the name of the game, but we recognize that a starting pitcher’s contribution to his team earning those wins can be measured in ways more meaningful than how often he satisfied the scoring requirements for being credited with a W.
ERA and ERA+
Traditionally, the other most important metric for a pitcher was ERA, and that remains a key factor in judging today’s pitchers. A pitcher’s ERA alone, however, does not tell the whole story because the balance between hitters and pitchers has shifted throughout the game’s history. For example, MLB average ERA in 1968 was 3.42; in 1998 it was 4.42. That is why pitcher evaluation focuses on ERA+, which is calculated by comparing a pitcher’s ERA, adjusted for park factors, to the league average (set at 100). This allows us to say not only that a pitcher’s ERA was good, but also how much better it was than the other pitchers of his era. A pitcher whose ERA+ is 150 in a season was much better than his peers.5 A career ERA+ of 150 is extremely rare; anything above126 puts a pitcher among the top 50 starters of all time.
Just as many Hall Fame pitchers did in the past, the best pitchers today have separated themselves from their peers by posting impressive career ERA+ numbers. The career leader in ERA+ among active starters with at least 1,500 innings pitched is Clayton Kershaw at 156. The top four after that are Sale (140), Scherzer (133), Cole (130) and Verlander (129). Jacob deGrom (1,367 IP) has a career ERA+ of 156.
Strikeouts
Unlike the historical milestone of 300 wins, reaching 3,000 strikeouts is still within reach of today’s best starting pitchers. CC Sabathia, who last pitched in 2019 recorded 3,093 strikeouts, and Zack Greinke was just 21 K’s short when he retired after the 2023 season. Among active pitchers, Max Scherzer and Justin Verlander have blown past that number (both approaching 3,500), and Clayton Kershaw needs only 32 more to reach 3,000. Chris Sale (2,414, age 36), who led the NL with 225 last year, and Gerrit Cole (2,251, age 34) also have legitimate shots at 3,000 if they can stay healthy.
The endurance of 3,000 strikeouts as an attainable career goal for starters, despite the decline in innings pitched, reflects another change in the game: the sharp increase over the past 25 years in the rate at which hitters strike out. Bob Gibson, who was legendary for his ability to fan opposing hitters, averaged 7.2 strikeouts per nine innings. Max Scherzer’s career average rate is 10.2, and Chris Sale’s 11.1. Seven of the top 10 career strikeout rates belong to starters active in 2025. More strikeouts per nine innings have offset the decline in innings pitched.
WAR
A more recent way to evaluate the quality of a pitcher’s career is through the lens of wins above replacement (WAR). Although it is a 21st century statistic, WAR can be calculated for all pitchers who have played the game based on historical data.6 Because it is a cumulative counting stat, career WAR favors pitchers who are productive over long careers—pitchers like Cy Young, Walter Johnson, Pete Alexander, and more recently Roger Clemens, Greg Maddux and Randy Johnson. But it still provides a basis to compare today’s best starters to those of prior eras. The highest ranking career bWAR among starters active today—Verlander (81), Scherzer (76) and Kershaw (74)—rank ahead of Hall of Famers like Jim Palmer, Roy Halladay and John Smoltz, and they are just behind Bob Gibson and Fergie Jenkins.
Black Ink Test
Still another measure that allows for meaningful comparison of career achievements among starters who played in dramatically different environments is the Bill James “Black Ink test.” This metric is based on points awarded for each time a pitcher leads the league in various statistical categories.7 While the points reflect peer-versus-peer excellence in a specific season, the cumulative Black Ink total shows how good a pitcher was over the course of a full career.
As a career metric, this test again puts the best pitchers in today’s game into context with greats of prior eras. Based on total Black Ink points, Verlander sits just behind Ryan and Maddux, and just ahead of Koufax and Carlton. Kershaw’s and Scherzer’s totals put them in the same company with Pedro, Seaver, Dizzy Dean and Carl Hubbel. And both Cole and Sale already have more Black Ink points than numerous starters in the Hall.
Game Score
Finally, one statistic uniquely applicable to starting pitchers (and one I have loved for a long time) is Game Score, invented by Bill James in the 1980’s to measure the dominance of a starting pitcher’s performance. Every starter begins the game with a baseline of 50 points, with points added for outs recorded, innings completed and strikeouts, and subtracted for hits, walks and runs allowed.8 A Game Score of 90 or higher is an exceptional start—a complete game shutout with 4 hits, no walks and 11 strikeouts produces a Game Score of 90. A score of 100 is almost, but not quite, unattainable—13 pitchers have achieved a game score of 100 in a nine-inning game. Nolan Ryan did it three times, Max Scherzer did it twice in one season, and Kerry Wood posted the highest ever—105—in his 20-strikeout game. While that mark may be even harder for today’s starting pitchers to reach, Cole did it in 2018 and Verlander in 2019.
Game Score has a correlation to historical greatness in pitching. Among pitchers whose careers post-dated the dead ball era, only seven starters with at least 1,500 innings pitched have career average Games Scores above 60—Koufax, Gibson, Seaver, Martinez, Kershaw, Scherzer, and Sale. A season-average game score of 60+ remains a relevant marker of excellence for a starting pitcher today. In the 2024 season, Rookie of the Year Paul Skenes had an average Game Score of 63.5 for his 23 starts. In his two Cy Young seasons, Jacob deGrom posted average Game Scores of 67.9 and 63.7. And in the three seasons he made more than 20 starts (2021-2023), Shohei Ohtani’s Game Score averaged 60.6. Game Score numbers confirm what our eyes tell us—that these pitchers have dominated on the mound.
My point in discussing these various metrics is that there are multiple ways (and several more I did not discuss) in the existing statistics toolbox to identify great pitchers without counting up how many wins they earned or how many innings they pitched. Look at the 7-10 best years of a pitcher like Greg Maddux or Pedro Martinez—at their ERA+ for those seasons, their Black Ink points, their average Game Score and their WHIP. You can see a compelling Hall of Fame case for them without ever dropping your eyes to check out their career total wins, innings pitched or strikeouts.
Peak Performance
Those BBWAA writers who voted this year for Felix Hernandez as a Hall of Fame pitcher made a case different from the one that got CC Sabathia elected and Andy Pettitte named on 30% of the ballots. As Marc Carig of The Athletic explained in the piece referenced at the beginning, “We can debate the breadth of King Félix’s career accomplishments, but this feels clear: Hernández was so dominant that he’s precisely the kind of player we should want to celebrate.” In that same article, Tom Britton wrote, “Félix Hernández was historically good through his 20s — good enough to mitigate the abruptness of his decline in his 30s.”
Putting aside whether one agrees with those assessments of Hernandez’s career as Hall-worthy, focusing on sustained dominance and peak performance seems like a reasonable way to make a case for a starting pitcher to enter the Hall. But that still leaves the questions: How good; how dominant; and for how many seasons?
Another way to use WAR is to focus on a pitcher’s peak performance—his 7-year peak WAR. Viewing starters through that narrowed lens puts Verlander, Kershaw, Scherzer and Greinke again comfortably on the spectrum with other greats already in the Hall. And it also highlights some arguably Hall-worthy starters who have been passed over, such as Johan Santana, David Cone, Dave Stieb, Luis Tiant, Kevin Brown and Bret Saberhagen. Felix Hernandez’s 7-year peak WAR of 38.5 puts him behind all of them.
For years, Jay Jaffe has employed what he dubs the “JAWS” Hall of Fame metric, which combines a player’s longevity (his career WAR) with his peak performance (his 7-year peak WAR). In evaluating each player’s case, he compares that players’s JAWS number to the average of all players already in the Hall of Fame at his position.9 Verlander, Kershaw and Scherzer, along with just-retired Zack Greinke, all have JAWS ratings above the average for starting pitchers in the Hall of Fame (61.5) and ahead of several first ballot inductees. Longevity is a significant attribute under this system; JAWS does not favor a pitcher with a short career but high peak value. Hernandez’s JAWS rating puts him no. 97 all time. Koufax is no. 96.
Nate Silver recently published two long pieces first explaining, then applying his algorithm for evaluating Hall of Fame candidates. He ranks players in eight categories, with weighted value applied to each: career value (3x), peak value (3x), “career landmarks” (2x), “season landmarks” (2x), post-season performance (2x), “unique talents and abilities” (1x), “franchise icon” (1x) and the Hall’s specified integrity, sportsmanship and character (1x). For each category he assigns a value from 0 to 10, “where 0 represents an average long-career major leaguer, 5 represents a typical Hall of Famer, and 10 represents GOAT.” Like Jaffe’s methodology, Silver seeks to balance longevity and peak value, while providing extra credit for various kinds of special characteristics. Applying this method to the 2025 ballot’s starting pitchers, he concluded that Sabathia qualified easily and Pettitte was an “average” Hall of Famer, while King Felix fell just short.
Joe Posnanski, who has been rethinking how voters should evaluate brilliant starting pitchers with relatively short careers, suggested a different approach in a JoeBlogs post entitled “Giving Genius Its Due.” Using Sandy Koufax as the paradigm case, he came up with a methodology awarding points for a pitcher’s seasons that were “perfect” (10 points), “great” (5 points), and “good” (2 points) and using the total to assess whether the pitcher had of a Hall of Fame career. There are obviously issues with applying what appear (at least in Posnanski’s initial pass) to be highly subjective categories, but the idea suggests a way for Hall voters to recognize pitchers who had a body of work so outstanding that they belong in the Hall of Fame despite the lack of a long career. His system gives similar ratings to Koufax and Johan Santana.
I think Posnanski is on the right track—that sustained peak performance ought to be one way to identify a Hall of Fame career.10 For years Koufax has been viewed as a rare exception, an obvious Hall of Fame pitcher even though his career included a relatively short window of brilliance (six seasons) and only modest career numbers. Koufax had just 165 career wins, a number that until very recently would generally have been viewed as fatal to a starter’s HOF credentials. His career WAR of 48.9, puts him well below the average of starters in the Hall. But the Black Ink test, which reflects how many different ways he was the best during his six great seasons, has him as the 15th best starter. Other measures, such as career ERA+ (130) and average game score (62.5) identify him as one of the best starters ever. And of course those who saw him pitch were awestruck by how good he was
Koufax’s path to the Hall of Fame is not unique. Dizzy Dean, elected by the writers in 1953, had only 150 wins over an 11-year career that ended, much like Koufax’s, after his age 31 season. In his early 20’s, Dean was brilliant. Over a span of six seasons, he won 133 games (including 30 in 1934), led the league in strikeouts four straight years, was voted MVP once and runner-up twice, and was credited with 40 WAR. But in the middle of the sixth great season, he was hit on the foot by a line drive during the All Star game, and after trying to come back too soon injured his arm and was never the same again. As a result, none of his career statistics come close to making out a Hall of Fame case. It took nine years, but the BBWAA voters eventually came to view his peak performance as so impressive they voted him in.
Maybe instead of treating Dean and Koufax as unicorns, their cases could help voters define a Hall of Fame standard against which we measure starting pitchers with exceptionally strong peak years, but relatively modest career totals. The characteristics of their relatively short flashes of brilliance could be recognized as a path for pitchers with similar career arcs. Other than obsolete notions like innings pitched, complete games, etc., the metrics that justify Koufax and Dean as Hall of Famers can be applied to candidates from the current era. Lay Johan Santana’s peak years—and his career ERA+, Black Ink number and average Game Score—against Dizzy Dean’s and see how they compare.
Future Hall of Famers?
The first-year vote for Felix Hernandez suggests he may be on a path to eventual induction to the Hall of Fame. As I noted in my last post, that would be a strange result given that Johan Santana, who retired just seven years before Hernandez, was more dominant for longer yet dropped off the ballot after getting only 2.5% of the vote his first year. How the writers treat Hernandez with Santana in their rearview mirrors could reflect a shift in how peak performance is weighed in evaluating starting pitchers.
Hernandez’s case will also present some interesting choices for Hall of Fame voters in the near term as as the ballot includes other excellent pitchers with traditionally not quite Hall-worthy careers. Along with Hernandez, Cole Hamels will be eligible for the first time next year, and Jon Lester will debut the following year.
Hamels had a career just one year shorter than Hernandez’s that largely overlapped with his. They had almost the same career statistics in wins (163 vs.169), innings pitched (2,698 vs. 2,729), strikeouts (2,560 vs. 2,524), ERA (3.43 vs. 3.42) and average Game Score per start (57 vs. 56). Hamels had both a better ERA+ (123 vs. 117) and higher career bWAR (59 vs. 49). Looking at peak performance, they had similar 7-year peak bWAR (37.4 to 38.5). While Hernandez has the one Cy Young award, Hamels earned MVP awards in both the LCS and World Series in 2008. Does one have a case that makes him a Hall of Famer, while the other does not? What separates them? If Hernandez is the one who gets to 75%, it will almost certainly be because he is perceived as having greater peak dominance.
Lester’s career similarly overlapped almost completely with Hernandez’s. And in several respects, those careers also look similar: nearly identical totals of innings pitched and strikeouts, and exactly the same career ERA+ of 117. In other ways they are quite different. Lester won 200 games to Hernandez’s 164, and his winning percentage of .631 was far better. Hernandez won a Cy Young award and led the league in ERA twice, while Lester did neither of those things. But Lester had a superlative record in the postseason—a 2.51 ERA in 26 postseason games, and a 4-1 record (1.77 ERA) in six World Series games. Hernandez may have been viewed as one of the best for a few years (and his higher 7-year peak WAR gives him an edge), but for most of his career Lester carried the reputation of being a “big game” starter. One in; one out? And for the same reason?
There is a decent argument that none of these fine pitchers—Hernandez, Hamels and Lester—should be voted in. None of the three has a case that can compare to those of Kershaw, Verlander, Scherzer or Greinke, either on the basis of career statistics or peak performance. While that is not conclusive, the question remains whether they have distinguished themselves from the other fine pitchers not in the Hall.
Take the position that Hernandez should get in because he was “so dominant” or “historically good” at his peak. In addition to Santana, compare him to David Cone, who also dropped off the ballot after his first year (receiving just 3.9% of the vote). Hernandez and Cone both won a Cy Young award and finished in the top four three other times. Cone had five full seasons with ERA+ of 130 or higher to three for Hernandez; he had five seasons with average Game Score of at least 60 to three for Hernandez. Cone’s 7-year peak WAR was 43.4 to 38.5 for Hernandez. As Nate Silver put it in his recent take, “Even us peak guys have to draw a line somewhere, and King Felix is just a little bit below it.”
And what are the writers going to do when Jacob deGrom finishes his career? DeGrom is 36 years old, has a grand total of 84 wins, and has pitched fewer than 1,500 innings. Over the last three seasons, injuries have limited him to only 20 starts (and he lost the better art of a season at his peak to the pandemic in 2020). Just a few years ago, mentioning him as a potential Hall of Famer with those numbers would have been viewed as ridiculous (and maybe still so). But in addition to his two Cy Young awards, he has four other top-10 finishes, a career ERA of 2.52 (156 ERA+) and the best strikeout-to-walk ratio of any starter in the history of the game. He is credited with 43.5 bWAR in just 218 starts—making him one of the most valuable pitchers per start ever. If deGrom were to win a third Cy Young in 2025, would it be unreasonable for voters to view him as a Hall of Fame starting pitcher even if he ends up compiling barely over 100 wins?
As a number of writers about Hall of Fame standards have pointed out, it isn’t just about the numbers. Sandy Koufax was an easy pick because to those who saw him pitch, the consensus was that he was the most dominant pitcher they had ever seen. Today, many observers (most of whom probably never saw Koufax) say the same thing about deGrom. When healthy, he has consistently overpowered hitters unlike any pitcher of his era, except perhaps Kershaw in his peak years. In short, he is arguably a Hall of Famer under one of the most venerable standards: the “eye test”.
Maybe we will not see another career like that of Kershaw, Verlander, Scherzer and Greinke, or even Cole and Sale. But maybe voters will come to conclude that under other statistics that characterize great pitchers of past eras, other starters will be dominant enough for enough seasons to be deemed just as worthy of induction. And in due course, it is likely a Veteran’s Committee will revisit pitchers like Johan Santana or David Cone and recognize they have strong peak value cases to join other starters in the Hall.
Perhaps MLB will change the rules to reverse the current trend among starting pitchers. As noted by David Adler for MLB.com, one of the recommendations in the recent Report on Pitcher Injuries is that MLB “consider rule changes that would ‘increase the value of pitcher health and durability, and decrease the value of short-duration, max-effort pitching’—for example, rules encouraging starting pitchers to pitch deeper into games.” I don’t know if this is in the cards or how such rules would work, but MLB has shown a recent willingness to make rules changes addressing trends it views as damaging baseball (speeding up the game, eliminating extreme defensive shifts, and most recently, moving toward an ABS challenge system).
And if this doesn’t happen, what should future Hall voters do? One thing is to use all of the statistics available to identify starting pitchers who both stand head-and-shoulders above their peers and compare favorably to past greats. But if, because of how the starter’s role evolves, none can put together a record that either hits some meaningful career milestones or presents a case of sustained dominance for enough years, what then? It is possible that the Hall of Fame-caliber starting pitcher is a species on its way to becoming extinct or, at a minimum, endangered. If that is the case, there is only so far we should go in redefining greatness before the term becomes meaningless.
On the Bill James Hall of Fame Monitor, which measures likelihood of induction compared to those already in the Hall, Cole is currently at 124 (with 100 being “likely HOFer”). Sale is at 98.
Despite the changes in how starters are used, the future Hall of Fame starters of the current era have not worked materially fewer innings per outing than great pitchers of a generation ago. Maddux, Martinez, Johnson, Glavine, Halladay, Smoltz and Mussina threw an average of just over 101 pitches per start over their careers. Maddux and Johnson were the outliers at 92 and 111 respectively. Kershaw, Verlander, Scherzer, Greinke, Sale and Cole have averaged just over 100, one fewer pitch per start over their careers (from Greinke at 96 to Verlander at 106).
Greg Maddux, who routinely pitched deep into games but never experienced serious arm injuries, had one of the lowest levels of pitcher abuse points (0.75 PAP per start). Maddux rarely threw more than 110 pitches in a game because his control was so superb and he allowed so few base runners that he pitched numerous complete games throwing fewer than 100 pitches.
The report also suggests the increased rate of injuries may be one result of how starters are being handled in the minor leagues. In the majors in 2024, starters worked at least five innings in 70% of their starts; minor league starters do so in only 40% of their games. And only 10% of starts in the minors were made on fewer than five days rest. One theory is that these trends in the minors deprive young starters of the preparation to withstand greater workloads in the major leagues.
The common parlance is that a pitcher with a 150 ERA+ was 50% better than league average. That does not seem quite right. The formula for ERA+ is 100 x (Lg. ERA/ERA). So, if a pitcher in one season has an ERA of 2.00 and the league average ERA is 3.00, the average pitcher was 50% worse; the pitcher’s ERA was actually 33% better than average. It doesn’t matter—150 ERA+ is excellent.
The two leading WAR models are those used by Baseball-reference and Fangraphs, commonly referred to as bWAR and fWAR. In contrast to WAR for position players, where the two usually coincide fairly closely, they use different formulas for calculating WAR for pitchers, which sometimes produce divergent results. For purposes of this post, I am not taking sides, but will consistently refer to bWAR values for pitchers.
Four Points for wins, earned run average or strikeouts; Three Points for innings pitched, win-loss percentage or saves; Two Points for complete games, lowest walks per 9 innings or lowest hits per 9 innings; and One Point for appearances, starts or shutouts
Specifically: “Start with 50 points. Add 1 point for each out recorded, (or 3 points per inning). Add 2 points for each inning completed after the 4th. Add 1 point for each strikeout. Subtract 2 points for each hit allowed. Subtract 4 points for each earned run allowed. Subtract 2 points for each unearned run allowed. Subtract 1 point for each walk.”
Jaffe takes one more step. After adjusting for players whose careers were predominantly in the dead ball era, Jaffe produces a metric he calls S-JAWS. For simplicity, I am just referring above to the raw JAWS number.
For a longer discussion of my view on the role of peak performance in identifying Hall of Fame players, see my post from several years ago, “Who Really Belongs in the Hall of Fame?”